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ESSAYS 
#ACADEMICFREEDOM: TWITTER AND FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS FOR PROFESSORS 
Michael H. LeRoy* 
INTRODUCTION 
Speech is not “free” in academia.  Campus codes regulate disrespect-
ful language.1  Professors have been disciplined for speech that creates a 
hostile learning environment for their students.2  Twitter has extended prof-
essorial speech to the Internet.  How do campus speech codes apply to a 
professor’s tweets?  There is scant information to answer this question; 
however, some tweets have stirred controversy.  Professor David Guth was 
put on leave by the University of Kansas for tweeting that the children of 
NRA supporters should be shot dead.3  The University of Illinois withdrew 
a job offer with tenure to Professor Steven Salaita because his tweets were 
viewed as “‘harassing, intimidating, [. . .] hate speech.”4  These tweets ex-
 
©  2015 Michael H. LeRoy.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so 
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review 
Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
*  Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations and College of Law, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law 
School.   I gratefully acknowledge Janet LeRoy, who suggested the #AcademicFreedom 
title. 
 1  E.g., CAL. INST. OF TECH., INSTITUTE POLICY ON ACCEPTABLE USE OF ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION RESOURCES (2013), available at http://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2005/02/Cal-Tech-Acceptable-Use-13-14.pdf (prohibiting communications 
that discriminate, harass, defame, offend, or threaten individuals or organizations). 
 2  Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 803–05 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 3  John Milburn, University of Kansas Professor David Guth Suspended Over Tweet 
Won’t Return in 2013, HUFF POST COLLEGE (Oct. 25, 2013, 1:59 PM), at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/25/university-of-kansas-david-
guth_n_4164298.html.  Prof. Guth tweeted, “‘The blood is on the hands of the #NRA.  Next 
time, let it be YOUR sons and daughters.  Shame on you.  May God damn you.’”  Id. 
 4  Interview of Chancellor Phyllis Wise, in Nicholas C. Burbules et al., A Response to 
the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure (CAFT) Report, (Jan. 6, 2015), at 7, 
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pressed outrage at Israel’s bombing of Gaza, and therefore, voiced a widely 
held political viewpoint. 
This Essay asks: is every tweet from a professor protected as a form of 
academic freedom by the First Amendment?  Professor Salaita’s watershed 
case poses sharply conflicting positions on academic freedom for faculty 
members.  In support of Professor Salaita, a faculty committee at the Uni-
versity of Illinois asserts: “Regardless of the tweets’ tone and content, they 
are political speech—part of the robust free play of ideas in the political 
realm that the [University] Statutes insulate from institutional sanction, 
even in the case of ideas we may detest.”5 
To answer my research question, I explore how courts rule on First 
Amendment claims by faculty members who have been disciplined or lost 
their jobs for speech that their school considered to be disruptive to its mis-
sion or operations.  These cases are a small but important part of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Two Supreme Courts opinions—Waters v. 
Churchill6 and Garcetti v. Ceballos7—provide colleges and universities a 
clear legal advantage.  My conclusion, based on more than forty cases in-
volving disruptive faculty speech, applies to different verbal controversies.  
No case, however, involves a professor’s tweets.  I explore how Twitter 
relates to academic expression, and I conclude that courts are unlikely to 
grant First Amendment protection to faculty tweets that direct physical in-
timidation to specific individuals or groups. 
I.     FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Early cases granted broad protection for the speech rights of teachers.8  
A high point was reached when professors successfully challenged a New 
 
available at https://archive.org/details/pdfy-uFQikP3A-pCpJj_Z (alteration in original) 
(quoting COMM. ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE OF THE UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-
CHAMPAIGN, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE MATTER OF STEVEN SALAITA 26 
(2015), [hereinafter SALAITA REPORT] available at 
http://www.senate.illinois.edu/af1501.pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).  One tweet 
implied that Jews bring anti-Semitism on themselves: “By eagerly conflating Jewishness 
and Israel, Zionists are partly responsible when people say antisemitic [sic] shit in response 
to Israeli terror.”  Steven Salaita, TWITTER (July 18, 2014, 1:19 PM), 
https://twitter.com/stevesalaita/status/490184057054322688.  Another tweet implied that 
every Jewish child grows up to become a murderer: “Zionist uplift in America: every little 
Jewish boy and girl can grow up to be the leader of a murderous colonial regime.”  Steven 
Salaita, TWITTER (July 14, 2014, 7:26 PM), 
https://twitter.com/stevesalaita/status/488872177257955328.  See also infra notes 52 & 54 
(providing additional examples of anti-Semitic tweets).   
 5  SALAITA REPORT, supra note 4, at 26 (emphasis omitted).  
 6  511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (government as employer has more power to restrict 
speech than government as sovereign).  
 7  547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
 8  E.g., Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).   
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York law that required them to swear an oath against Communism.9  The 
Supreme Court singled out academic freedom as “a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom.”10  More recently, the Supreme Court has gradually 
restricted speech rights for public employees.11  These limits have seeped 
into academia.12  According to Connick v. Myers, speech of public employ-
ees is constitutionally protected if it concerns a matter of public interest or 
importance.13  Courts determine if speech is protected under the First 
Amendment by examining its context, form, and content.14  These elements 
are weighed against the employer’s interests in a Pickering balancing test.15  
Courts also judge whether the disputed speech motivates an adverse em-
ployment action.16 
More recently, two significant restrictions have been added to this bal-
ancing approach.  Waters v. Churchill ruled that a public employer is not 
required to prove that employee speech is disruptive.17  All that is required 
is an employer’s reasonable prediction of interference with a governmental 
function.18  Garcetti v. Ceballos stated that speech for public employees is 
not protected if it pertains to the internal affairs of government units.19  
These restrictions were forged in a hospital and a state’s attorney’s office, 
where employers exert significant control over employee speech.20  Justice 
Souter noted in Garcetti, however, that the disruptive speech doctrine does 
 
 9  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).  
 10  Id. at 603. 
 11  See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675; Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
 12  Estelle A. Fishbein, New Strings on the Ivory Tower: The Growth of Accountability 
in Colleges and Universities, 12 J.C. & U.L. 381, 382–85 (1985) (stating that courts and 
Congress put “colleges and universities on an inexorable march toward academic accounta-
bility”). 
 13  461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
 14  Id. at 147–48. 
 15  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 16  Id. 
 17  511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (holding that the government as employer has more pow-
er to restrict speech than the government as sovereign).  
 18  Id. at 673 (holding that public employers are allowed to make reasonable predic-
tions of when speech disrupts operations). 
 19  547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).  
 20  Id. at 419 (noting that government employers need significant control over their 
employees’ words and actions).  
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not translate easily to academia,21 where intense disagreement can drive 
inquiry.22 
How have these precedents affected faculty members who assert a 
First Amendment right?  Eighteen court opinions ruled in favor of schools 
in the course of discussing disruptive faculty speech.23  In losing these cas-
es, faculty invoked the First Amendment to justify discussions of personal 
details about their sex life,24 inappropriate advances,25 wanton vulgarity,26 
and required reading about their sexual arousal.27  Other losing cases in-
volved faculty whose speech was confrontational, degrading, or conducive 
to an atmosphere of tension.28 
In contrast, twenty-three opinions specifically referenced disruptive 
faculty speech and ruled for a faculty member.29  The greater number of 
 
 21  Id. at 438 (“I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First 
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose 
teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). 
 22  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (noting that civilization de-
pends on freedom of inquiry for teachers and students).  
 23  See DePree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 282 (5th Cir. 2009); Trejo v. Shoben, 319 
F.3d 878, 878 (7th Cir. 2003); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 800 (6th Cir. 2001); Jack-
son v. Leighton, 168 F.3d 903, 903 (6th Cir. 1999); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 106 F.3d 391, 
391 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 9 (2d Cir. 1995); Ghosh v. 
Ohio Univ., 861 F.2d 720, 720 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 
1546, 1547 (11th Cir. 1988); DePree v. Saunders, No. 2:07cv185KS-MTP, 2008 WL 
4457796 at *1 (S.D. Miss. 2008 Sept. 30, 2008), aff’d 588 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2009); 
Marinoff v. City Coll. of N.Y., 357 F. Supp. 2d 672, 672–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Scallet v. 
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 999 (W.D. Va. 1996), aff’d 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996); Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents, 739 F. Supp. 
551, 551 (D. Colo. 1990), aff’d, 945 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1991); Fong v. Purdue Univ., 692 
F. Supp. 930, 931 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Landrum v. E. Ky. Univ., 578 F. Supp. 241, 242 (E.D. 
Ky. 1984); Bradford v. Tarrant Cnty. Jr. Coll., 356 F. Supp. 197, 197 (N.D. Tex. 1976), 
aff’d, 492 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1974); Franklin v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 218 Cal. Rptr. 
228, 228 (Cal. App. 1985); Mills v. W. Wash. Univ., 208 P.3d 13, 13, 21 (Wash. App. 2009) 
rev’d on other grounds, 246 P.3d 1254 (Wash. 2011) (en banc). 
 24  Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1007. 
 25  Trejo, 319 F.3d at 888. 
 26  Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 803–04.  
 27  Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1410 n.3. 
 28  See Maples, 858 F.2d at 1554; Fong, 692 F. Supp. at 955; Mills, 208 P.3d at 21.   
 29  See Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2003); Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. 
Coll., 260 F.3d 671 (6th Cir. 2001); Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc); Burnham v. Ianni, 98 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated, 119 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 
1997); Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 996 (1994), 
rev’d on remand, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995); Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Stern v. Shouldice, 706 F.2d 742 (6th Cir. 1983); Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 
1982); Kim v. Coppin State Coll., 662 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1981); Trotman v. Bd. of Trus-
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these cases, compared to the group that favored schools, suggests that dis-
ruption does not work against faculty in speech cases.  However, only eight 
opinions ruled for instructors after 1994 when Waters gave public employ-
ers latitude to predict institutional disruption.30 
Nonetheless, one significant precedent ruled against a school that as-
serted a disruptive speech argument.  In Hardy v. Jefferson Community 
College, a college instructor who taught a communication course devoted a 
class period to language that marginalizes minorities.31  Students offered 
words such as “‘girl,’ ‘lady,’ ‘faggot,’ ‘nigger,’ and ‘bitch.’”32 After their 
classmate complained to campus administrators, Professor Hardy was ter-
minated.33  Distinguishing this case from Bonnell v. Lorenzo,34 the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that this was “a classic illustration of ‘undifferentiated 
fear’ of disturbance on the part of the College’s academic administrators.”35 
In rare cases, courts found that schools violated the First Amendment 
rights of professors whose controversial beliefs caused disruption.  The 
Second Circuit ruled that a professor engaged in constitutionally protected 
speech when he published his view that African-Americans are intellectual-
ly inferior to Caucasians—even though this caused disruptive protests.36  
Faculty members who criticized campus administrators engaged in protect-
ed speech, even if their communications unsettled operations.37 
 
tees, 635 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1980); Appel v. Spiridon, 2011 WL 3651353 (D. Conn. 2011 
Aug. 18, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 521 Fed. App’x 9 (2d Cir. 2013); Milman v. 
Prokopoff, 100 F. Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 81 F. Supp. 2d 777 
(E.D. Mich. 1999), rev’d, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001); Burnham v. Ianni, 899 F. Supp. 395 
(D. Minn. 1995), rev’d, 98 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 119 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(en banc); Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 996 (1994), rev’d on remand, 52 F.3d 
9 (2d Cir. 1995); Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev’d, 926 F.2d 
1066 (11th Cir. 1991); Hickingbottom v. Easley, 494 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Ark. 1980); 
Croushorn v. Bd. of Trustees, 518 F. Supp. 9 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin 
State Univ., 486 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev’d, 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1982); Cooper 
v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Aumiller v. Univ. of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 
(D. Del. 1977); Duke v. N. Tex. State Univ., 338 F. Supp. 990 (E.D. Tex. 1971), rev’d, 469 
F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Close v. Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969), rev’d, 424 
F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970). 
 30  Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1229; Hardy, 260 F.3d at 671; Burnham, 119 F.3d at 668 (en 
banc); Burnham, 98 F.3d at 1007; Appel, 2011 WL 3651353 at *20; Milman, 100 F. Supp. 
2d at 954; Burnham, 899 F. Supp. at 395.  Notably, the Burnham case contributed three 
opinions to this small total. 
 31  260 F.3d at 671. 
 32  Id. at 675. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at 678–79 (citing Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 35  Id. at 682. 
 36  See Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 37  See Trotman v. Bd. of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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One case epitomized the amorphous boundary that demarcates the 
First Amendment’s protection of academic freedom.  The City University 
of New York (CUNY)’s Professor Leonard Jeffries gave a widely publi-
cized speech in Albany that made insulting references to Jews.38  In re-
sponse, CUNY removed him as department chair but retained him as a fac-
ulty member.  Professor Jeffries won damages and reinstatement to his de-
partment chair position.39  But the Supreme Court vacated the Second Cir-
cuit’s affirmance of the trial court’s ruling.40  Afterwards, the appellate 
court reversed itself,41 ruling that CUNY had a reasonable belief that Pro-
fessor Jeffries’s speech would disrupt its operations.42 
In sum, the disruptive speech doctrine that has taken hold for public 
sector employers has had an apparent effect on First Amendment faculty 
cases.  Professors usually lose cases if their employer proves that it had a 
reasonable belief in characterizing their speech as disruptive. 
II.     TWITTER AND THE SPEECH RIGHTS OF PROFESSORS 
To date, there are no Twitter cases involving college faculty.  Given 
the growing popularity of this messaging service, Twitter controversies are 
likely to result in litigation.  Courts will not treat Twitter as a unique speech 
category.  Instead, tweets will be judged by their context, form, and con-
tent.43 
How might this framework apply to faculty tweets?  For context, 
Twitter is a social media technology that allows people with an account to 
publicize their views to the world.  Its broad platform for social connectivi-
ty enables professors to publicize discourse.  For form, Twitter is an awk-
ward tool to communicate academic ideas.  Its rigid architecture impedes 
scholarly exchange.  Marx would probably have found some epigrammatic 
ways to use Twitter; but Das Kapital would not squeeze into 140-character 
tweets.  For content, Twitter does not offer a scholarly culture.  Most 
tweets are babble (about 40%) or conversation (about 37%).44  Very little 
information is socially significant; news is about 4% of tweets.45  The tone 
 
 38  Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing 
CUNY’s president as the “‘head Jew at City College’”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 21 
F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 996 (1994), rev’d on remand, 52 F.3d 9 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
 39  Id. at 1071. 
 40  Harleston v. Jeffries, 513 U.S. 996 (1994) (vacating Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 
1238 (2d Cir. 1994)), rev’g on remand, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 41  Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 42  Id. at 13. 
 43  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
 44  See Twitter Study, PEAR ANALYTICS (Aug. 2009), pearanalytics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Twitter-Study-August-2009.pdf. 
 45  Id.  
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of tweets is also problematical for academic speech.  By compressing 
speech, Twitter forces some speakers into attention-seeking tweets that be-
come instant embarrassments.  Some evidence suggests that Twitter facili-
tates bigotry.46  A recent research project, titled the “Geography of Hate,” 
used a Google map to track tweets that are homophobic, racist, or demean-
ing to disabled people.47 
For now, Twitter is not a medium for much academic speech.  Fol-
lowers do not seek deep insights.  Tweets are shallow.  Twitter content 
rarely concerns news.  But Twitter is also a robust social medium that ex-
presses social and political commentary.  It illuminates conditions in cen-
sored parts of the world.48  It is an evolving technology, with a growing 
network of communities.  Scholars are beginning to employ Twitter for 
professional purposes.49  Some have already established Twitter reputa-
tions.50  More are likely to follow. 
In sum, Twitter cannot be summarily dismissed as an outlet for aca-
demic speech, but neither can it be ranked on a par with a classroom, con-
ference, or peer-reviewed publication. 
Returning to my research question: is every tweet from a professor 
protected as a form of academic freedom by the First Amendment?  In the 
wake of Waters and Garcetti, colleges and universities have won most First 
Amendment cases involving disruptive faculty speech.51  This strong trend 
implies that tweets that disrupt a school’s mission or operations are not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 
 
 46  See, e.g., Jackson v. Deen, No. CV492–139, 2013 WL 1911445, at *4 (S.D. Ga. 
May 8, 2013) (plaintiff attorney in case involving race discrimination claim against TV 
celebrity Paula Deen often tweeted racially-charged language). 
 47  Monica Stephens, Geography of Hate: Geotagged Hateful Tweets in the United 
States, HUMBOLDT STATE. UNIV., http://users.humboldt.edu/mstephens/hate/hate_map.html# 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015).  The map was based on all geocoded tweets in the United States 
from June 2012 to April 2013 that contained hate words such as “fag,” “nigger,” and other 
offensive terms.  Id.  
 48  Shannon Williams, Foreigners Denied Facebook and Twitter as North Korea Or-
ders Blanket Ban, TECHDAY NETGUIDE (Nov. 3, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://netguide.co.nz/story/foreigners-denied-facebook-and-twitter-as-north-korea-orders-
blanket-ban/. 
 49  See G. Veletsianos, Higher Education Scholars’ Participation and Practices on 
Twitter, 28 J. COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING 336 (2012). 
 50  David Burkus, Top Professors on Twitter, DAVID BURKUS, http://ldrlb.co/top-
professors-on-twitter/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 51  Compare cases decided after 1994 in supra note 23 (eleven wins for schools), with 
cases decided after 1994 in supra note 29 (eight wins for faculty members).  See also supra 
note 30 (indicating that three opinions that faculty won were from one case). 
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At this point, only one Twitter lawsuit is pending.52  In public appear-
ances, Professor Salaita contends that the University of Illinois rescinded 
his job offer due to donor pressure that resulted from his anti-Israel 
tweets.53  A faculty committee found no evidence of donor pressure, but 
also rejected the school’s civility rationale for not forwarding Professor 
Salaita’s appointment.54 
After Professor Salaita filed his lawsuit in federal court, the campus 
published a list of some tweets that led to the withdrawal of his job offer.55  
In addition, Professor Salaita re-tweeted a post that appeared to advocate 
the stabbing death of a pro-Israel journalist.56  Near the time he filed his 
lawsuit, he posted a vaguely homicidal tweet that can be read as intimida-
tion directed at the chancellor who blocked his appointment.57  Professor 
 
 52  Jodi S. Cohen, Steven Salaita Files Lawsuit Against the University of Illinois, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
steven-salaita-lawsuit-met-20141117-story.html.  
 53  Steven Salaita, Steven Salaita: U. of I. Destroyed My Career, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 29, 
2014, 6:36 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-steven-
salaita-tenure-jews-twitter-tweets-unive-20140929-story.html. 
 54  SALAITA REPORT, supra note 4. 
 55  A Statement by the University re Steven Salaita Complaint, UNIV. OF ILLINOIS (Jan. 
29, 2015), http://uofi.uillinois.edu/emailer/newsletter/66664.html.  The news release includ-
ed the following tweets: 
“You may be too refined to say it, but I’m not: I wish all the f**king West Bank settlers 
would go missing.”  
“Zionist uplift in America: every little Jewish boy and girl can grow up to be the leader of a 
monstrous colonial regime.” 
“If #Israel affirms life, then why do so many Zionists celebrate the slaughter of children? 
What’s that? Oh, I see JEWISH life.” 
“Zionists: transforming antisemitism [sic] from something horrible into something honora-
ble since 1948.” 
“Let’s cut to the chase: If you’re defending #Israel right now you’re an awful human being.” 
The first tweet referred to three Israeli teens who were kidnapped while hitchhiking in the 
West Bank on June 12 or June 13, and found dead several days later.  See Ray Sanchez, 
Hamas Leader Admits Militants Abducted Slain Israeli Teens, CNN (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:01 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/meast/israel-teens-death-hamas/. 
 56  See Steven Lubet, Professor’s Tweets about Israel Crossed the Line, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-speech-
steven-lubet-salaita-university-illinois-20140814-story.html (reporting Prof. Salaita’s re-
tweet of the “vile suggestion that journalist Jeffrey Goldberg ought to get ‘the pointy end of 
a shiv’”).  Prof. Salaita’s “shiv” re-tweet looks even less deserving of First Amendment 
protection after the beheading of two journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff.  See Chel-
sea J. Carter, Video Shows ISIS Beheading U.S. Journalist James Foley, CNN (Aug. 20, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/; Chelsea J. Carter & 
Ashley Fantz, ISIS Video Shows Beheading of American Journalist Steven Sotloff, CNN 
(Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/meast/isis-american-journalist-
sotloff/. 
 57  It states: “My last boss mysteriously disappeared. #FiveWordstoRuinAJobInter-
view.”  Steven Salaita, TWITTER (Jan. 17, 2015, 10:48 PM), 
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Salaita and his supporters contend that all of his tweets deserve First 
Amendment protection.  I suggest, to the contrary, that some tweets are not 
constitutionally protected.  My research shows that when a university 
makes a reasonable prediction that students or faculty would feel intimidat-
ed by personally abusive or demeaning speech, courts support actions that 
promote a campus climate of tolerance. 
 
 
https://twitter.com/stevesalaita/status/556659301511864320.  This tweet uses similar death-
imagery to Prof. Salaita’s “wish” that settlers “would go missing.”  See supra note 55. 
